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I. INTRODUCTION
The critical problem in Chapter I I bankruptcy is the problem of "other
people's money" or, in the lexicon of economic theory, of the "agency
costs"' that arise when the managers of a business will not reap the full
benefit or incur the full detriment of their decisions. In Chapter 11,
debtors' prebankruptcy managers generally remain in control of the
business after filing. These managers in most cases are also the primary
shareholders of the business. They may have little to lose and much to
gain by continuing the business, attempting to reorganize and avoid the
inevitable demise even as the value of the business erodes and profession-
al fees and other costs mount.
In the normal nonbankruptcy operation of a corporation, a combination
of contractual terms, legal rules, and market conditions act to limit the
moral hazard that exists when managers have interests that do not
1. Agency costs include the costs of monitoring managers, the costs of bonding by these
agents, and the losses that result from the "divergence between the agent's decisions and those
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal." Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976) (footnote omitted).
2. A shareholder of the debtor in In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1988), was unusually candid when he stated that "there is no shareholder equity-so we've got
nothing to loose [sic]. The banks have it all on the line now-not us." Id. at 765 (addendum).
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coincide with the interests of the firm's owners.3  One important
limitation on the hazard is the shareholders' right to vote in corporate
affairs. When a corporation files for relief under Chapter 11, bankruptcy
law replaces the normal regime of limitations with the debtor in
possession (DIP) system,4 which fails to adequately constrain the DIP's
authority, permitting the DIP to act in ways that decrease instead of
maximize the value of firm assets. In particular, Chapter 11 replaces the
state law voting regime with a markedly different franchise procedure.
The voting rules in Chapter 11 are central to the Code scheme for
confirming a plan of reorganization. Yet, while the literature includes
numerous proposals for addressing the moral hazard of DIP management
in Chapter I I,' it almost completely ignores the relationship between
3. In general, a moral hazard problem arises whenever an actor can undertake risky behavior.
without fear of loss because the loss will fall on others. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 181-82 (5th ed. 1998).
4. Upon bankruptcy, the prebankruptcy managers continue to operate the business as the
"debtor in possession." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter )) Reorganizations: Reducing Costs,
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581 (1993) (advocating appointment of a trustee in all Chapter
11 cases to make "Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions" and a methodology for the trustee to
determine whether the debtor should be reorganized or liquidated); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting
Auctions in Chapter 1/, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993) (arguing that upon bankruptcy large, publicly
traded companies should be put on the auction block); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (proposing cancellation of equity interests
unless shareholders pay their pro rata share of the corporation's debts); James W. Bowers, Groping
and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics
of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990) (calling for repeal of Chapter 11); Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (arguing that
shareholders' interests should be automatically canceled upon bankruptcy, whereupon the next highest
class of claimants would become the equity class); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties
in Corporate Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 385 (1998) (advocating amendment
of Chapter II to ensure that unsecured creditors can enforce DIP's fiduciary duties); Christopher W.
Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
89 (1992) (recommending a "shift in attitude" whereby courts would be more sensitive to the
insufficiency of the limitations on management in Chapter 11 and the need to look to the wishes of
the parties most directly affected by a proposed transaction); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with
Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729 (proposing several procedural revisions of Chapter 1I, including
adoption of a separate reorganization procedure for smaller debtors, preemptive cramdown of
"underwater" equity interests, and limitation of exclusivity in larger cases); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992)
(proposing that the owners of a firm be allowed to choose from a menu of bankruptcy regimes at the
time the firm is formed). See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New
World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465 (summarizing and criticizing several of the
various proposals for reforming Chapter 11 that have been offered in response to the agency costs
problem of DIP management, and proposing a separate reorganization provision for small business
debtors).
In their seminal article, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,
Professors Baird and Jackson criticized the rule of Boyd v. Northern Pacific Railway, 28 U.S. 482
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agency costs and the Chapter 11 voting rules. The notable and important
exception is an article by Professor David Skeel,6 who concludes that the
voting regime in Chapter 11 is only superficially different from the
system of voting under state law and that the bankruptcy franchise
operates to limit agency costs of DIP control.7  In fact, there are
fundamental and significant differences between the state law voting
regime and the Chapter 11 franchise. Principally, notwithstanding the
conventional wisdom, the Chapter 11 voting rules exacerbate instead of
restrict agency costs.
This Article begins by reviewing the agency costs that arise in firms
outside of bankruptcy and the web of limitations on these costs. In
particular, the Article examines how the state law voting regime affects
managers' incentives to maximize the value of a firm. Under state law,
shareholders generally hold the exclusive right to vote and exercise their
right to vote by electing directors and approving fundamental corporate
changes. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, this regime is replaced by a system
that gives the right to vote to most claim and equity holders and
mandates a single vote on the plan of reorganization. While the state law
regime gives voting authority to the group that has the appropriate
incentives to maximize the value of the firm, the bankruptcy vote is
intended only to determine the allocation of the value of the firm among
the various claim and interest holders. One provision of the present
Bankruptcy Code,8 section 1129(a)(10), is best understood as an attempt
to limit agency costs by requiring approval of the plan by the class of
(1913), for giving all claim and interest holders a place in the reorganization negotiations regardless
of whether the value of the firm is sufficient to yield any payment to them. See Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55
U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 774-75 (1988). They argued that,
To the extent that our critique of Boyd is right,, the law of corporate reorganizations
should focus on identifying the residual owner, limiting agency problems in representing
the residual owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over the
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring.
Id. at 775. More recently, Professors LoPucki and Whitford conducted a groundbreaking study of
governance in cases of large, publicly held corporations. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993). They similarly wrote that "[t]he root of the problem
• . . lies in the separation of the possibility of future gain from the risk of future loss ...
[M]anagement's undivided loyalty to the interests of either shareholders or some or all creditors will
lead to decisions that are too risk prone or too risk averse . I..." d. at 787 (proposing stricter limits
on the time debtors can spend in Chapter I I and risk compensation payments to creditors whose
distributional rights are impaired by a requirement that management maximize the value of the
estate).
6. David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992).
7. See id. at 462-63.
8. See II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (as amended).
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creditors with the appropriate incentives to maximize the value of the
firm.9 The courts have misunderstood and misapplied this section,
however, so it has not served as an effective constraint on Chapter 11
agency costs. In fact, commentators have called for repeal of section
1129(a)(10).' ° The Article concludes that the Code should be revised to
effectively require approval of a plan of reorganization by the claim or
interest holders with the appropriate incentives to maximize the value of
the firm, just as shareholders in solvent corporations outside of bankrupt-
cy hold ultimate authority over operation of the business.
II. AGENCY COSTS AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING OUTSIDE OF
BANKRUPTCY
Parts III and IV of this Article will examine the nature of agency costs
in Chapter 11, the limits that the DIP system places on these agency
costs, and the relationship between the agency costs of DIP management
and the voting regime in Chapter 11. As a predicate to that discussion,
this Part reviews the nature of agency costs, and the legal, contractual,
and market mechanisms that operate to limit these costs in corporations
outside of bankruptcy. Readers familiar with agency cost theory may
safely skip to Part III.
The nature of agency costs and the limitations on them differ depend-
ing on whether the firm is widely or closely held and on whether it is
solvent or insolvent. In widely held corporations where the managers are
not significant shareholders, the separation of residual ownership" and
control of the firm creates agency costs. In addition, the presence of debt
in the capital structure of such corporations may impose further agency
9. See id. § i 129(a)(10) (requiring acceptance of a plan by at least one class of impaired
claims, excluding insiders, if any class is impaired).
10. See, e.g., REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFER-
ENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECT 276-77 (1994) [hereinafter REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE];
John R. Clemency & John A. Harris, The Fight Over "Artificial" Impairment Under§ 1129(a)(10):
It's Time to Call It Quits, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 1995, at 20, 23 n.10; Randolph J. Haines,
Elimination of the Needfor an Accepting Impaired Class, 1995-96 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 203, 203-
04; Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J.
551, 568 (1995); Gregory K. Jones, Comment, The Classification and Cram Down Controversy in
Single Asset Bankruptcy Cases: A Need for the Repeal of Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(10), 42
UCLA L. REV. 623, 625 (1994).
11. The term "residual owners" refers to those with the right to the balance of the income and
assets of a firm after full payment of senior claims. When a firm is solvent, the equity holders are
the residual owners. When a firm is insolvent, the residual owners are the class or classes of
creditors that will receive some, but not full, payment on their claims after full payment of any senior
classes. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 106-09 (1984).
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costs on the operation of the firm. In closely held companies where the
managers are the major shareholders, agency costs stem primarily from
debt in the capital structure. The nature of these two sources of agency
costs in firms outside of bankruptcy, and the relationship between agency
costs and the state law voting regime, are a logical starting point for
analyzing the Chapter 11 franchise.
A. The Firm as a "Nexus of Contracts"
Modem corporation law theory regards the firm as a "nexus of
contracts," that is, as the central party to a collection of contracts with
shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, and suppliers by which the
means of production are coordinated. 2 This contractarian view of the
firm reduces the distinction between shareholders and creditors by casting
both as "owners" of the firm with certain rights of control over the firm's
decisions, albeit with different contractual rights respecting the income
and assets of the firm.'3  Thus, while creditors' contracts with the
corporation give them fixed rights to payment, shareholders' contracts
entitle the shareholders to the residual value of the firm. Under the
contractarian view, state corporation laws are generally understood as
default rules of contract law that govern in the absence of contrary
agreement among the various parties. 4
The principal insight of the "nexus of contracts" perspective is that the
divergent interests of managers, shareholders, and creditors--each of
whom is assumed to pursue his own utility-impose agency costs on the
operation of the firm. 5 Managers act as agents of the firm's owners,
with primary responsibility for making investment (asset deployment)
12. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288,
289-91 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301, 302 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 310-1I. Instead of contracting with
one another, the factors of production contract with the firm. See Fama, supra, at 290.
The corporate form of business organization allows people to realize benefits from the division
of labor; it permits skilled managers, who may not have the capital to finance a venture, and
shareholders, who may lack the skills to operate the venture, to collaborate in a business that will
increase the wealth of both. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1986). This specialization of inputs also
permits investors to diversify their portfolios, thereby reducing risk and encouraging investment. See
id.
13. See Fama, supra note 12, at 290; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 312-23.
Accordingly, as used in this Article, the term "owners" includes all entities with a claim or interest
in a finn-shareholders with equity interests as well as creditors holding claims against the
corporation. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 100-06 & n.15 ("By 'investor' (or 'owner'), we
mean anyone with rights, however contingent, to the debtor's assets under nonbankruptcy'law.").
14. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 401-02 (1983).
15. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 311.
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decisions, yet have interests that may differ from those of the firm's
various owners.'
6
B. The Agency Costs of Separation of Equity Ownership and Control
In widely held corporations, the divergence of interests among
shareholders and managers imposes costs on the firm when the managers
(1) arrogate perquisites that lessen the value of the firm, and (2) fail to
seek or take opportunities that would maximize the value of the firm but
are viewed as too risky by management. 7 The managers may own some
of the firm's stock, but their holdings generally represent a very small
proportion of the total shares. Thus, the managers may share only a
small fraction of any gains or losses that will result from their decisions.
Managers have an interest in their own utility-preserving and enhancing
their own positions and reputations. The risk of unemployment is not
easily diversified, so managers will avoid financial distress of the firm
that might lead to loss of employment, even though an investment
decision would maximize the firm's value.' 8
To illustrate, consider a publicly held firm with assets valued at $100
and debt totaling $75. Assume a business opportunity that presents a
50/50 chance of success. If the investment is successful, the firm will net
$50. If it is a failure, the firm will lose $30. This opportunity has a
positive net value to the firm of $10.' 9 Nevertheless, the managers may
be inclined not to pursue it because failure would render the corporation
insolvent and jeopardize their employment and reputations.20
C. Limits on the Agency Costs of Separation of Equity Ownership
and Control
1. The Shareholder Franchise as a Limit on Agency Costs
While the separation of residual ownership and control imposes agency
costs on the firm, these costs are subject to numerous constraints.
Foremost is the corporate decision-making structure, which gives
shareholders of a solvent firm ultimate authority over the firm's affairs.
16. See id. at 308-09.
17. See id. at 312-13; see also Fama, supra note 12, at 295-97.
18. See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment
Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1173-75 (1994); see also Fama, supra note 12, at 291-92, 296.
19. If the investment is successful, the value of the firm's assets will be $150. If unsuccessful,
the value will be $70. Because the chance of success is 50/50, the projected value of the firm is
($150 + $70)/2, or $110, which is $10 more than the present value of the firm's assets.
20. In contrast, shareholders will likely favor the investment because they are primarily
interested in maximizing the value of their equity interests and are willing to countenance greater risk
because they can diversify that risk with other investments. See discussion infra Part il.C. I.
1998]
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They, in contrast to any other class of owners, possess the appropriate
incentives (setting aside for now the collective action problem2") to make
decisions that maximize the value of the firm. Shareholders are the
residual owners of the firm, that is, their rights to the cash flow and
assets of the firn are subordinate to the rights of creditors with fixed
claims.2 As residual risk bearers, shareholders of a solvent business
stand to both reap the benefits and bear the costs of their decisions; stated
differently, the potential for loss is fused with the possibility of gain. 3
Take, for example, a firm with assets valued at $100 and debt totaling
$75. Assume that the firm is presented with an investment opportunity
with a 50/50 chance of netting $15 or losing $10. The shareholders have
the best incentives regarding this decision because they will enjoy the full
benefit as well as suffer the full loss that may result from deploying the
firm's assets to take advantage of this opportunity. If the investment is
successful, the shareholders will enjoy the entire benefit; their equity
interest will increase in value from $25 to $40. If unsuccessful, the
shareholders' interest will decrease from $25 to $15. In contrast,
creditors may be largely indifferent, if not adverse, to the investment
because it might decrease the size of the equity cushion.
The role of shareholders in corporate decision making varies depending
on whether the firm is widely or closely held. The essential components
of corporate decision making are identification and initiation of proposals,
ratification of decision initiatives, implementation of ratified decisions,
and monitoring of decision agents. 4 Initiation and implementation
decisions are typically performed by the same agents-the managers of
the business." The ratification and monitoring functions are also
typically performed by the same agents-either the managers or the
shareholders and directors, depending on whether the firm is closely or
widely held.26 It has been demonstrated that when residual risk bearing
is separated from the initiation and implementation (management)
functions, the management functions are separated from the ratification
and monitoring (control) functions.27 Thus, in widely held corporations
in which the residual risk bearers (the shareholders) do not manage the
firm, the management and control functions are clearly divided between
the managers, on the one hand, and the board of directors and sharehold-
21. The collective action problem is discussed infra note 41 and accompanying text.
22. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 403.
23. See id. at,403-06; Fama, supra note 12, at290-91; Fama &Jensen, supra note 12, at 302-
03; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 312-13.
24. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 12, at 303-04.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 304-11.
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ers on the other.2" Conversely, the combination of management and
control authority in a few agents typically occurs when residual claims
are held by those same agents.29 In close corporations, the managers are
also the principal shareholders and exercise authority over both manage-
ment and control decisions.3 °
In widely held corporations, shareholders exercise their ratification and
monitoring (control) functions through the shareholder franchise. The
right to vote is the right to make all of the myriad corporate decisions
that are not and cannot efficiently be otherwise specified by contract or
legal rule.3 Shareholders generally elect directors and delegate most of
their authority to make unspecified decisions to the directors,32 who in
turn elect or appoint officers to manage the business.33 At the same time,
shareholders retain authority to remove managers at any time 4 and to
approve charter amendments" and fundamental corporate changes-
mergers, acquisitions, and sales of a substantial portion of firm assets.36
When a corporation has more than one class of shares, changes to the
rights of the shareholders in one of the classes must be approved by a
majority vote of both the affected class and all shareholders.37
In addition to explaining that shareholders generally hold the right to
vote because they hold the appropriate incentives to maximize the welfare
28. See id. at 307-11.
29. See id. at 305-07.
30. See id.
31. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 403-06. Easterbrook and Fischel were the first
writers to examine the relationship between agency costs and corporate voting. This Part draws
heavily on their work. They note the right to vote is an aspect of the web of contracts that comprise
a firm. See id at 401. A firm's contracts with shareholders (the corporate charter and by-laws),
creditors (loan and other credit agreements), and managers and employees (employment contracts)
govern operation of the business. See id. Further, legally prescribed "default rules"-contract terms
supplied by corporate law that apply in the absence of contrary agreement by the parties (and which
thereby reduce costs of contracting when the default rules meet the parties' needs) supplement
express contractual terms. See id at 401-03. In addition, the fiduciary standard governs the conduct
of officers and directors. See id. at 402. Contract provisions, default rules, and the fiduciary
principle, however, "cover only the outlines of the relations among corporate actors." Id. Of
necessity, many decisions about the conduct of the business will not be specified by contract or
applicable law. See id. at 401-03.
32. See, e.g., REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (1991) ("Except as provided in [a
shareholder agreement], each corporation must have a board of directors.").
33. See id. § 8.40.
34. See id. § 8.08(a). This authority is sometimes limited by employment contract provisions
that make it prohibitively expensive to fire managers.
35. See id. §§ 10.03, 10.20.
36. See id. §§ 11.03, 12.02. Corporate laws generally require approval by a majority of all
shares, not simply a majority of shares voting, for fundamental corporate changes. See id. §§
10.03(e), 11.03(b)(2), 12.02(b)(2).
37. See id. §§ 10.03, 10.04.
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of the firm,3" agency cost analysis also explains why the right to vote is
almost invariably limited to shareholders alone. Including other
constituencies would introduce agency costs by permitting persons who
do not stand to realize the marginal benefits and losses of their decisions
to affect firm decisions. Likewise, the rules and practices that assign one
vote per share39 ensure that each shareholder holds the appropriate
incentives to make efficient corporate decisions. Cumulative voting and
vote selling introduce agency costs by creating an asymmetry between
voting power and economic consequences.4"
While the justification for the shareholder franchise may be clear-that
shareholders hold the appropriate incentives to maximize the wealth of
the firm-the efficacy of corporate voting is open to question. Tradition-
al corporate law theory viewed the shareholder franchise as virtually
meaningless in widely held corporations because the collective action
problem precludes effective exercise of the franchise. The Wall Street
Rule, which states that a dissatisfied shareholder's recourse is to sell her
shares, was seen as the only real protection for investors against poor
management. 4'
More recently, Fischel and Easterbrook have challenged the traditional
wisdom.4" They persuasively argue that the right to vote has considerable
utility at the margins. 43 This utility is evidenced by the following facts:
voting facilitates corporate takeovers; voting contests increase share
prices; the aggregation of claims increases the value of the aggregated
shares; in the unusual cases where there are classes of stock with identical
rights except that one class has voting rights, the class with voting rights
trades at a slightly higher price; and firms without shareholders do less
well than typical corporations.44 Significantly, shareholder accumulation
38. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 403-06. That shareholders hold the exclusive
right to the franchise may, in addition, be explained on the ground that shareholders cannot safeguard
against misbehavior by managers as readily as creditors and employees, who may have firm-specific
investments that limit managerial discretion. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 568-72.
39. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.22(d).
40. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 403-06.
41. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 129 (rev. ed. 1968). In widely held firms, the collective action problem explains the lack
of shareholder involvement in the corporate democracy. Shareholders are rationally apathetic because
each shareholder owns only a tiny fraction of the equity, and the costs of participating in
management-reading proxy materials and voting-exceeds any possible benefit to the shareholder.
This collective action problem is a rational response to the costs and benefits of participation in the
corporate franchise. The collective action problem dissipates when an individual shareholder (e.g.,
an institutional investor) acquires a significant equity stake in a firm.
42. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 406-08.
43. See id.
44. See id.
[Vol. 46
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of shares lessens the collective action problem.45 In sum, "votes are
important despite the collective action problem, and the voting process
enables firms to operate more efficiently."46
2. Other Limits on the Agency Costs of Separation of Equity
Ownership and Control
In addition to the shareholder franchise, contracts between the firm and
its managers (e.g., stock options, agreements tying executive compensa-
tion to corporate profits, and golden parachutes) can be used to encourage
managers to take more risks and thereby reduce the agency costs of the
separation of equity ownership and control.47 Further, the markets for
the sale of stock and corporate control check agency costs by encouraging
managers to maximize the value of the firm or else suffer decreases in
stock value that jeopardize the managers' positions by exposing the firm
to corporate takeover bids.4s Likewise, the managerial labor market
disciplines managers.49 The legal rules imposing fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty on the officers and directors of a corporation also act to limit
agency costs.50
45. See id. Historically such accumulation was unlikely, but more recently institutional investors
have acquired substantial stakes in most public corporations, making it worthwhile for these
shareholders to participate in the management of the firm. See, e.g., PAUL R. BERGEN, VOTING BY
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1988 PROXY SEASON (1988)
(noting institutional investors are continuing to increase participation in corporation governance);
CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 218 (2d ed. 1996) ("The 1990s have witnessed a surge of
institutional investor participation in corporate governance ...."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
14, at 425-26 (noting increased involvement by institutional investors); John Pound, The Rise of the
Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005
(1993) (underlying more active boards are institutional investors).
46. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 408.
47. See Adams, supra note 5, at 602; Frost, supra note 5, at 106-07; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note I, at 323-28; Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 1175-76. Of course, the costs of these arrangements
are themselves agency costs.
48. See Adams, supra note 5, at 602-03; Frost, supra note 5, at 106-07; Jensen & Meckling,
supra note I, at 329; Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 1175-76.
49. See Fama, supra note 12, at 292-95; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 328.
50. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.42, 8.60-8.63 (1991). The duty of care
generally requires officers and directors to exercise the degree of care that ordinarily prudent persons
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. See id. §§ 8.30(a), 8.42(a). The duty of
loyalty requires officers and directors to refrain from self-dealing and usurping corporate
opportunities. See id. §§ 8.60-8.63. These fiduciary duties imposed by law are not, of course,
entirely efficacious. The business judgment rule ameliorates the requirements of the duty of care by
establishing a presumption that directors have fulfilled the duty; most courts hold that directors are
not personally liable for breach of the duty of care in the absence of gross negligence. See generally
I JAMES D. Cox Er AL., CORPORATIONS § 10.2 (1995). Further, it is not entirely clear to whom the
duties of care and loyalty are owed. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act states the duties
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D. The Agency Costs of Debt
It is well recognized that the capital structure of a firm influences
managers' decision making." While the shareholders of a solvent
corporation generally share both the possibility of future gain and the
are owed to the corporation, but the interests of the corporation depend largely on what group
constitutes the residual ownership class. See the discussion infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text,
regarding the shift in management fiduciary duties upon insolvency of the corporation.
5 I. While equity is necessarily a component of the capital structure, debt is not. The use of
some debt is considered efficient, but the optimal mix of debt (and of various types of debt) and
equity is the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN A.
CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 372 (3d ed. 1987) ("One of the most
widely debated issues in financial theory continues to be whether the value of the corporate enterprise
can be enhanced by a judicious use of leverage, i.e. by financing corporate investments with senior
securities as well as common shares."); Michael Bradley et al., On the Existence of an Optimal
Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence, 39 J. FIN. 857, 857 (1984) ("One of the most contentious
issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital
structure."); George G. Triantis, Debt Financing, Corporate Decision Making, and Security Design,
26 CAN. Bus. L.J. 93, 94-97 (1996) ("The fixed obligations of debt are a source of discipline on
managers that requires minimal monitoring."). The use of debt increases the potential return on
investment to the equity holders while simultaneously increasing the risk of the investment. See
Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
117, 119 (1991) (citing BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUES 539-50 (4th ed. 1962)). Adams poses this example:
Consider, for example, an investment that has a 50/50 probability of returning either
$50,000 or $150,000, so that the expected return is $100,000. If $1,000,000 of capital
is needed for this investment and this capital is provided entirely by equity, then the
investment would yield an expected rate of return of ten percent. The expected rate of
return for equity holders would increase substantially if $900,000 of the capital came from
debt paying nine percent interest, and the remaining $100,000 came from equity. The
expected return for equity would then be $19,000 (obtained by subtracting interest to debt
holders of $81,000 from the expected return before interest of $100,000), and the
expected rate of return for the $100,000 of equity would be nineteen percent. With the
introduction of debt, the expected rate of return for equity has nearly doubled. At the
same time, the riskiness of the equity investment has increased dramatically because the
expected return, after interest payments of $19,000, is the average of a 50/50 probability
of either a $31,000 loss, or a $69,000 profit on the $100,000 equity investment. The use
of debt for capital financing both dramatically improves the rate of return for shareholders
and exposes their investment to increased risk.
Id. at 119-20 (footnotes omitted).
In large, widely held corporations, the capital structure often is complicated with many levels and
types of debt and equity. For example, debt might include institutional secured debt, public secured
debt (bonds), subordinated and unsubordinated debentures, unsecured institutional debt and unsecured
trade debt, and the equity interests may include various levels of preferred and common stock. The
capital structure of most small, closely held businesses is comparatively simple: the firm has a
primary secured creditor who holds a security interest in virtually all of the firm's assets; trade
creditors whose claims are relatively small in relation to the secured debt; and one or several equity
holders who also manage the firm. See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms
and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913, 920-24 (1994); Samuel L. Bufford, What Is
Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 835 (1994).
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potential for future loss, these prospects are not symmetrical when the
capital structure includes debt. Shareholders hold unlimited upside
potential, but limited downside risk by reason of the limited liability
rule. 2 In contrast, debt holders have fixed claims and may recover no
more than the amount of those claims. These divergent interests of debt
and equity holders may impose agency costs on the operation of the
firm.5
3
While shareholders generally hold the appropriate incentives to
maximize the welfare of the firm, their authority over all unspecified
decisions presents the clear possibility that they will exploit their conflicts
with debt holders to the detriment of the firm.54 In the case of a solvent
firm, shareholders have an interest in pursuing profitable investments.
However, they sometimes will also find it profitable to pursue opportuni-
ties with a negative value because they will reap the benefits but not
suffer all losses from the investment.5 Consider, for example, a firm
with assets of $100 and debt totaling $90. The firm has a business
opportunity that will require a $100 investment and has a 50/50 chance
of producing a gain of $60 or a loss of $100. This investment has a
negative net value of $20. Yet, the shareholders will tend to favor the
investment because it increases the value of their equity from $10 to $35.
In other words, the shareholders would enjoy the entire benefit if the
investment is successful, but suffer only $10 of the $100 loss if it is
unsuccessful. The creditors of course will disfavor the investment
because they stand to gain nothing more than an enhanced equity cushion,
but risk a complete loss. Thus, a firm will incur agency costs to the
extent that the presence of debt in the capital structure causes its
managers to make overly risky, negative net present value investments.
E. Limits on the Agency Costs of Debt
The agency costs of debt are circumscribed in several ways. As an
initial matter, creditors may attempt to limit managerial discretion through
their contracts with the firm, for example, by contracting for a large
equity cushion, prohibiting further encumbrances on assets of the firm,
requiring approval for the issuance of new debt, or making impairment
52. As discussed infra, Part II.E., the shareholder-managers of closely held firms often are
guarantors of much of the firm's debt and, thus as a practical matter, are not protected by the limited
liability rule.
53. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 333-43; Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 1167-73.
In close corporations, the managers are the equity owners, and the impact of the capital structure on
manager decision making is direct. In widely held corporations, the effects are mediated by the
presence of the non-owner managers.
54. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note I, at 334-37.
55. See id. at 333-43; Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 1167-73.
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of the expectation of repayment an event of default. In addition,
creditors of closely held firms often require the principals to guarantee
their debts. Guarantees align the managers' interests with the interests of
creditors and thus may reduce the agency costs of debt by ensuring that
the managers will experience the losses that may result from their
decisions. Of course, guarantees do not perfectly align managers'
interests with the creditors' interests. The manager-guarantors maintain
interests of their own. Whereas creditors are generally diversified in their
credit risks, managers cannot diversify against the risk of unemployment.
Further, the individual managers' option to file bankruptcy and seek a
discharge of their obligations means that they do not assume the entire
risk of their decisions. 6
F. Agency Costs and Insolvency
Insolvency,57 which is the financial condition of almost all Chapter 1 1
debtors, dramatically increases the potential agency costs of debt. Upon
insolvency, creditors replace shareholders as residual owners of the firm.5"
Like the shareholders of a solvent firm, the residual creditors of an
insolvent firm hold both the potential for gain and the possibility of loss
from investment decisions and, therefore, have the appropriate incentives
to maximize the value of the firm.59 In contrast, shareholders of an
insolvent firm may profit from firm investments, but have nothing to
lose.60 While liquidation of the firm may be in the best interests of
creditors, shareholders have nothing to gain from it. 61 Just when the need
56. An individual debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts may receive a Chapter
7 discharge even though she could pay all or most of her debts from future income. See I I U.S.C.
§ 707(b) (1994) (requiring dismissal when a case would be a "substantial abuse" of the provisions
of Chapter 7). The most important, if not exclusive, consideration in whether a filing constitutes a
"substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 is whether the debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts
could repay a significant portion of her debts from future income. See, e.g., In re Walton, 866 F.2d
981, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1989). Section 707(b) apparently exempts debtors whose debts are not
primarily consumer debts from dismissal of their cases for "substantial abuse" precisely because
Congress did not want to discourage entrepreneurial risk.
57. "Insolvency" does not refer to bankruptcy. "Insolvency" means a financial condition such
that the sum of all debts exceeds the value of all assets of the firm. See I I U.S.C. § 101 (32)(A).
58. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO
L. REv. 647, 667 (1996).
59. See id. at 666-67.
60. See id. There is, however, an important difference between the residual ownership interest
held by the shareholders in a solvent firm and the residual ownership interest of creditors of an
insolvent firm. As long as the firm continues to operate, shareholders of an insolvent firm may be
seen as having some residual ownership interest because their interests might obtain value if the
fortunes of the firm sufficiently improve. In contrast, creditors with fixed claims stand to benefit
from investment decisions only up to the amount of their claims.
61. See id.
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for effective control (ratification and monitoring)62 of managers' decisions
is most acute-when the firm is on the verge of collapse-shareholders
lose the appropriate incentives to make efficient decisions.
Yet, upon insolvency the same managers continue to manage the firm
and shareholders almost always retain their authority. As a result, closely
held firms where the managers are also the major shareholders confront
not only the agency costs of debt, but also the agency costs of the
separation of residual ownership and control. Significantly, even though
risk bearing is not aligned with decision management in these firms,
decision management is not separated from decision control. Unlike
managers in a solvent widely held firm who act subject to the control
authority of the residual owners, the shareholder-managers of an insolvent
closely held firm exercise both management and control authority.63
In insolvent widely held corporations, managers who are primarily
interested in their employment and reputations may be inclined toward
overly risky investment decisions, so as to reverse the firm's fortunes.
Insolvency encourages previously risk-averse managers to take unwarrant-
ed risks in order to turn around the company and save their job positions
and reputations."
Managers of insolvent firms will have incentives to pursue investment
strategies without regard to risk, with the strategy depending on the
options and the degree of the firm's insolvency. As in the case of the
solvent firm, the managers of an insolvent firm may pursue investments
that have no value for the firm but which benefit the equity holders.
Thus, assume a firm has assets of $100 and debt totaling $140. Further
assume an investment opportunity with a 50/50 chance of yielding a net
gain of $80 or a net loss of $0. This investment has a negative net value
to the firm (-$10), but increases the value of the shareholders' equity
from (-$40) to $0.
Under different circumstances the shareholders may have incentives to
underinvest. Assume a firm with assets worth $90 and debt totaling
$120. Assume further a business opportunity that has a 50/50 chance of
a net $15 gain or a $5 loss, so that the opportunity has a net present
value of $5. Although this investment would increase the value of the
firm, the equity holders may not have the incentives to seek or take this
opportunity because it will not yield any value to their interests. The
residual claim holders obviously would favor it. Thus, equity holders
may tend to bypass valuable opportunities when they are not expected,
62. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate decision-making
process and the division of decision-making authority between managers and residual owners).
63. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
64. See Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 1174.
19981
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
alone or in combination with other investments, to yield any value for the
equity class.6
G. Limits on Agency Costs in Insolvent Firms
While residual owner suffrage is rare in insolvent businesses,"" other
constraints on agency costs give creditors authority over an insolvent firm
that is comparable to the authority held by shareholders in solvent firms.67
Most significantly, creditors' contracts with the firm may impose
restrictions upon managers' discretion to operate the firm in the event it
encounters financial difficulty. Contracts often provide that insecurity
concerning repayment of a debt is grounds for declaring a default. Upon
the debtor's default (when the firm typically is insolvent and creditors
have become the residual risk bearers), the creditor (either secured or
unsecured holding a judgment) acquires the right to seize assets of the
firm. This right gives the creditor leverage to restrict managers' decision
making. Along similar lines, the corporate charters of some widely held
firms provide that upon insolvency bondholders acquire the right to vote
and thereby the control of managerial decision making. In addition, as
noted above, personal guarantees of the corporate managers would
constrain agency costs by imposing upon managers the risks of their
investment decisions.68
In addition to contractual constraints on agency costs associated with
insolvency, the state law fiduciary obligations owed by officers and
directors to shareholders69 are extended to include creditors when the firm
becomes insolvent, because creditors become the residual owners and
equity holders lose the appropriate incentives to maximize the value of
the firm.7" The officers and directorsof an insolvent firm face potential
65. The underinvestment problem should not be overstated. Over time the firm will encounter
multiple opportunities that together might yield value to the equity interests. See Rasmussen, supra
note 18, at '1171-72.
66. Except in the infrequent instances when bondholders of financially distressed firms acquire
the right to vote, a residual owner franchise is not a limitation on the agency costs that may arise
upon insolvency.
67. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 404 ("The right to vote (that is, the right to
exercise discretion) follows the residual claim .... When the firm is insolvent, the ... creditors
eventually acquire control .....
68. See supra Part II.E.
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354-56 (1985);
In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) ("IThe 'majority rule' permits recovery by
creditors of an insolvent corporation for mismanagement .... "); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea
Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[W]hen the corporation becomes insolvent, the
fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors."); Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1981); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications, Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch.
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liability for management decisions that disregard the interests of the
creditors in favor of the shareholders.
Finally, with respect to insolvent firms, state laws proscribe fraudulent
transfers,7' preferences to insiders,72 and dividend payments to equity
holders. 73  These laws permit creditors to avoid transfers or obligations
that benefit manager-shareholders at the expense of the firm's creditors.
III. AGENCY COSTS AND THE DEBTOR IN POSSESSION SYSTEM IN
CHAPTER 11
Chapter 11 addresses two fundamental issues. The first concerns
deployment of the debtor's assets.7 ' The need for relief under the
Bankruptcy Code arises when a firm is unable to pay its debts. While
inability to pay debts frequently indicates that the debtor's use of its
assets is not efficient, the advisability of redeploying assets (i.e.,
liquidating them) does not necessarily follow from the fact of financial
crisis. A firm with income insufficient to cover both the costs of
production and debt service may be using its assets efficiently if income
derived from the assets exceeds costs of production."
Chapter 11 also addresses the critical issue of how the value of the
firm should be allocated among the various claim and equity holders.76
The allocation question is largely governed by the absolute priority rule,
which states that no junior claim or interest may receive any distribution
of firm assets unless all senior claims and interests are paid in full." In
Chapter 11, a plan may propose to deviate from the absolute priority rule
if the adversely affected classes of claim and interest holders consent;
1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). The efficacy of fiduciary duties to creditors, however,
is undermined significantly by the business judgment rule and by the difficulties in measuring the
point of insolvency. Liability of officers or directors for breach of any fiduciary duty to creditors
has been reserved for the most egregious cases.
71. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4, 5(a) (1985).
72. See, e.g., id. § 5(b).
73. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 6.40(c), 8.33 (1991).
74. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 209-10
(1986).
75. See id. A business is viable when income exceeds the costs of production, although the net
income may be insufficient to pay debts. A business is not viable when the present liquidation value
is greater than the present value of the future net operating income. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A
General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311,
325-27.
76. See JACKSON, supra note 74, at 210-13.
77. See II U.S.C. § I 129(b)(2)(B) (1994).
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compliance with the absolute priority rule is subject to negotiation among
the debtor, creditors, and equity holders.7"
The prebankruptcy managers of a firm generally continue to operate
the firm after the Chapter 11 filing. As the DIP, the managers are
responsible for the "management" functions79 of initiating and implement-
ing deployment and allocation decisions. At the same time, these
managers are subject to the same conflicts of interest that arise among
owners and managers outside of bankruptcy. Thus, the managers of an
insolvent firm in Chapter 11 naturally favor reorganization and delay, and
they are prone to overly risky or risk-averse decisions.8" They will avoid
liquidation because it would put them out of a job and irrevocably
terminate their equity stakes. The residual owners-who are creditors
when the business is insolvent--do not, however, hold authority over
control decisions8' that is equivalent to the control held by residual
owners outside of bankruptcy. 2 The ratification and monitoring functions
of the residual risk bearers outside of bankruptcy a are displaced by the
DIP system in Chapter 11, which fails to adequately limit the agency
costs that arise in an insolvent firm.
A. DIP Authority in Chapter 11
The Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor shall continue to
manage the firm after filing for relief under Chapter 11,4 unless the court
orders appointment of a trustee. 5 As manager of the business, the DIP
faces two basic types of deployment and allocation decisions: "business
plan" decisions and "reorganization plan" decisions.8 6 The business plan
78. See id. § 1129(a)(8), (b). While liquidation entails a market sale of assets to third parties,
reorganization is in effect a sale of assets to the existing claimants. In a reorganization, existing
claimants become the owners of the reorganized debtor in exchange for releasing their prebankruptcy
claims. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 74, at 210-11; Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85, 94 (1995).
79. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate decision-making
process, and the division of decision-making authority among managers and residual risk bearers).
80. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text (discussing agency costs in insolvent firms).
81. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate decision-making
process, and the allocation of decision-making authority among managers and residual risk bearers).
82. Cf Skeel, supra note 6, at 482-84.
83. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate decision-making
process, and the allocation of decision-making authority among managers and residual risk bearers).
84. Upon filing, the debtor becomes the debtor in possession, see 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994),
and the debtor in possession is authorized to operate the business. See id. §§ 1107, 1108.
85. See id. § 1104.
86. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 678-79; see also Adams, supra note 5, at 592-93
(stating that DIP faces three types of decisions: "Business Activity Decisions," which involve choices
concerning the use of assets and day-to-day operations; "Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions," which
involve decisions concerning whether to reorganize or liquidate and the allocation of losses among
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is the set of decisions by which the DIP seeks to restore the profitability
of the business. It concerns deployment of the firm's assets, including
day-to-day operations, borrowing money, sales of assets, and assumption
or rejection of executory contracts and leases.87 These decisions will
affect the value of the firm and thus the losses that creditors will incur on
their claims. The reorganization plan may also address business plan
decisions. Moreover, the reorganization plan determines the capital
structure of the business and the distribution of cash, stock, and other
property to the claimants.88 Implicit in a plan of reorganization is the
decision not to liquidate all of the firm's assets.
The DIP generally possesses the exclusive right to make management
decisions, that is, to initiate and implement both the business and
reorganization plans.89 This authority is especially broad with respect to
business plan decisions.9" The DIP may unilaterally make decisions that
fall within the ordinary course of business without even disclosing its
business plan to creditors or the court, much less obtaining ratification of
such decisions.9 Further, although the DIP must obtain court approval
for business plan decisions that fall outside the ordinary course of the
debtor's business,92 the power of initiative combines with the DIP's
information advantages and the courts' general deference to DIP business
judgments93 to give the DIP substantial ratification and monitoring
authority in addition to its powers of initiative and implementation.94
With respect to the reorganization plan, the Code grants the DIP the
exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days after the entry of the order for
relief, which period the court may extend "for cause."9  The DIP's
information advantage over claimants facilitates control over business and
plan decisions. The managers have greater knowledge of business
the various claimants; and "Non-Polar Decisions," which are a combination of Business Activity and
Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions).
87. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 679, 692.
88. See id. at 679.
89. See id. at 692.
90. See id.
91. See II U.S.C. §§ 363, 364 (1994); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 692.
92. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364.
93. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 692, 694. For example, courts review most
decisions to assume or reject an executory contract or to sell property of the estate under a business
judgment standard analogous to the business judgment rule that is applied to questions of director
liability under nonbankruptcy corporate law. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying business judgment rule to executory contract
decision); Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring a "good business reason" for a proposed sale of assets).
94. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 692-94.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (d).
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operations, control the employees who generate the information, and
control access to the information.96
B. Direct Limits on the Agency Costs of DIP Management
The DIP's discretion to make business and reorganization plan
decisions is constrained by a complex web of statutory and case law.
The most significant limits on DIP control in Chapter II are (1) the
fiduciary obligations owed by the DIP to creditors and equity holders, (2)
the right of claimants to replace the DIP with a trustee under specified
circumstances, (3) the requirements for notice and hearing on matters
outside the ordinary course of the debtor's business, (4) the rights of
claimants to vote on and object to the debtor's plan and to propose their
own plans of reorganization, (5) the provisions for creditors' and equity
holders' committees, (6) the rights of creditors to withdraw credit from
the business, and (7) the bankruptcy court's power to manage its cases.
As discussed in this section, these provisions have failed to adequately
limit the agency costs of the DIP system.97
Analogous to the fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty owed by
officers and directors of solvent companies outside of bankruptcy,9" the
Code imposes fiduciary duties on the DIP with respect to operation of the
business in bankruptcy.99 The courts frequently state that the DIP's
fiduciary duty runs to creditors.' In addition, the prevailing view is that
the DIP also acts as a fiduciary for the interests of the equity holders.'0 '
The interests of different creditors frequently conflict with one another
and with the interests of shareholders. Thus, while it is clear that the DIP
is a fiduciary, the nature and extent of the DIP's obligations are uncertain
and enforcement is therefore complicated.' 2 Further, the courts generally
apply a business judgment standard to DIP decisions,' 3 which gives a
presumption of validity to DIP decisions that is especially hard to rebut
in light of the uncertain nature and extent of the fiduciary obligation.
The bottom line is that the fiduciary obligations imposed by the Code do
not represent a significant limitation on DIP authority. Claimants seldom
96. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 694.
97. See generally Adams, supra note 5, at 61 1-21.
98. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
100. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 707-09 & nn.148-49 (collecting cases); see also
Adams, supra note 5, at 611-13.
101. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 709.
102. See Adams, supra note 5, at 612. See generally Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between
Management and the Debtor in Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 CINN. L. REv. 543 (1992).
103. See Adams, supra note 5, at 612-13 & nn.154-60 (collecting cases).
[Vol. 46
VOTING THEORY IN CHAPTER 11
move to enforce the duties; 0 4 seeking appointment of a trustee is a better
response to DIP breaches of the fiduciary duty. °5
As a limit on DIP misbehavior, the Code provision for replacing the
DIP with a trustee is also of marginal utility. Section 1104 provides that
the court shall appoint a trustee to replace the DIP for "cause, including
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement," or when the
appointment of a trustee is in the interests of creditors and equity
holders.' Consistent with Congressional intent,'0 7 this remedy for DIP
misbehavior is rarely invoked, primarily because the pre-bankruptcy
managers are most familiar with the business and many debtor businesses
could not survive the cost and disruption of bringing in a trustee.
Further, in small debtor cases, the appointment of a trustee is tantamount
to a decision to liquidate the business because the operation of the
business depends in the first place on the shareholder-managers.
As to business plan decisions, the Code limits DIP authority by
requiring court approval after notice and hearing for transactions outside
the ordinary course of business.' 8 Thus, creditors can object and be
heard on DIP decisions to use cash collateral,"° obtain credit,"0 or sell
assets"' other than in the ordinary course of business. Similarly, the DIP
may assume or reject executory contracts and leases only with court
approval after notice and hearing." 2 At the same time, however, the
courts generally review DIP decisions in these matters under a "business
judgment" standard that gives considerable deference to the DIP." 3
As to reorganization plan decisions, the debtor's exclusive power of
initiative is limited by the requirements for acceptance of the plan by
claimants and approval by the court." 4 As discussed in the next Part,
creditors may influence reorganization plan decisions by voting and
objecting to the plan, but the larger purpose of the voting rights under the
current provisions of Chapter 11 is to allocate the going concern
surplus-the difference between the going concern and liquidation
values--of the firm and not to determine whether reorganization is a
104. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 709; see also Adams, supra note 5, at 612-13.
105. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 709-10.
106. 11 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(I), (2) (1994).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 402-03 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, at
6358-59.
108. See, e.g., II U.S.C. §§ 363(a), 363(c), 364, 365(a).
109. See id. § 363(c).
110. See id. § 364.
IlM. See id. § 363(a).
112. See id. § 365(a).
113. See Adams, supra note 5, at 612-13 & nn.154-60 (collecting cases).
114. See II U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1129.
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better response than liquidation to the firm's financial crisis."' A plan
that fails to fully pay unsecured creditors cannot be confirmed unless (1)
the plan cancels the rights of junior claimants or (2) all classes of
unsecured claims vote to approve the plan by more than two-thirds in
amount and one-half in number of the claims in each such class."16
Moreover, the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan expires four months
after the filing of the petition, unless extended by the court "for cause,"
and creditors may then propose their own plans." 7 As a practical matter
in most smaller cases, however, it is not feasible for anyone other than
the DIP to prepare a disclosure statement and propose a plan. This is
because the business cannot exist independent of its shareholder-
managers, and the size of individual creditor claims will not justify the
expense of formulating, negotiating, and obtaining confirmation of a non-
debtor plan." 8 Thus, in many cases the DIP effectively holds the sole
"right" to file a plan even after the exclusivity period has legally expired.
In large cases, the courts routinely extend exclusivity. Because delay
postpones payment of creditor claims and tends to erode the value of the
business, the exclusive right to file a plan confers considerable leverage
on the DIP and counteracts the creditors' rights to vote on and object to
the plan." 9
In regard to both business and reorganization plan decisions, the Code
calls for the appointment of an unsecured creditors' committee in all
Chapter 11 cases. 20 Chapter 11 also provides that the court may appoint
additional creditors' committees and an equity holders' committee if
necessary to "assure adequate representation of creditors or equity
security holders."'' Committees may retain counsel and other profession-
als who will be paid from the estate, and expenses of individual
committee members may likewise be reimbursed from funds of the
debtor.'22 Creditors' committees do not have any final decision-making
authority, but they have broad rights to take part in DIP decision
making' and committee positions may be given great weight by the
court. The regulation of DIP decision making by creditors' committees
has proved largely ineffectual, however, in small and medium-sized
115. See id.
116. See id. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8), (b).
117. See id. § 1121.
118. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code? (Second Installment), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 256-57 (1983).
119. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 693-94.
120. See II U.S.C. § 1102(a).
121. Id. § 1102(a)(2).
122. See id. § 1103(a).
123. See id. § 1103(c).
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Chapter 11 cases. In most of these cases, committees are not orga-
nized,124 unencumbered assets of the estate may be insufficient to pay
professional fees and committee expenses, and the size of even the largest
unsecured claims may not justify the trouble and expense of serving on
the committee. 25 Further, committee members may not have sufficient
expertise to serve effectively.' 26
The rights of creditors to withdraw credit from the debtor present
another constraint on DIP decision making.127  The automatic stay
precludes creditors from collecting their claims after the bankruptcy
filing, 28 but secured creditors are entitled to relief from the stay under
certain circumstances. 29 Moreover, both secured and unsecured creditors
may find leverage in withholding future credit to the business. 3 Indeed,
in many small and medium-sized businesses, the financing for continued
operations will come from cash and receivables generated by the business
that constitute cash collateral, which may be used only with the consent
of the secured creditor or approval of the court upon a finding of
adequate protection. 3' The DIP typically must negotiate cash collateral
and postpetition financing orders with the prepetition secured creditor,
and the lender is likely to obtain significant restrictions on operations.
Again, these sources of creditor control are limited in their effectiveness.
If the debtor can provide adequate protection to secured creditors and find
replacement vendors for those who withdraw future credit, the debtor is
not otherwise constrained by these creditors' rights.3 2
Finally, the discretion of managers to control the business in Chapter
11 is subject at all times to oversight by the bankruptcy court33 and
monitoring by the United States Trustee, who may move to dismiss or
convert a case as appropriate.' 34 As noted, the DIP must obtain court
124. See LoPucki, supra note 118, at 250-51 (finding that creditors committees were appointed
in only 40% of cases studied, that only 47% of these committees hired counsel, and that only 11%
of these retained accountants); see also Jerome Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for
the Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 183 (1987) (finding that creditors'
committees were active in only 16-38% of cases studied).
125. See LoPucki, supra note 118, at 25 1.
126. See id. at 251-53; see also Adams, supra note 5, at 615.
127. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 701-04.
128. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(a).
129. See id. § 362(d).
130. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 701-04.
131. See II U.S.C. § 363(b), (c).
132. The limited control creditors may exercise by withdrawing credit in bankruptcy contrasts
sharply with the significant control creditors may exercise by withdrawing credit and seizing assets
outside of bankruptcy. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
133. See I I U.S.C. § 105(a); see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 716-19.
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3).
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approval for activities outside the ordinary scope of business.'
Moreover, the Code authorizes the bankruptcy judge to actively manage
his or her cases, ' 36 and, as evidenced by the results of a study of judicial
case management in the Central District of California, such techniques
may significantly reduce the time debtors spend in Chapter 11.137 The
effectiveness of judicial and governmental constraints on DIP authority
depend on the particular judge or trustee, and crowded dockets undoubt-
edly limit the extent of their involvement.
C. Indirect Limits on Agency Costs in Chapter 11
In addition to the direct constraints on DIP authority discussed in the
preceding section, the Bankruptcy Code contains a number of provisions
that may indirectly limit agency costs in Chapter 11. When the most
efficient deployment decision is liquidation, a prompt liquidation may be
brought about by the filing of a motion to dismiss or convert the case.
Code section 1112 authorizes any party in interest, including the United
States Trustee, to seek dismissal or conversion when there is no
reasonable prospect of reorganization. 3 Similarly, a secured creditor's
motion for relief from the stay, if granted, may bring the case to a quick
end when the motion concerns a major asset of the business. Under Code
section 362(d), a secured creditor is entitled to relief from the stay if the
debtor is unable to provide adequate protection of the creditor's
collateral.' 39 If continuation of the business requires the use of cash
collateral or postpetition financing, the denial of the motion for such use
will also bring the case to a close and cause redeployment of the firm's
assets. Under section 363, the DIP must adequately protect the secured
creditor's interest in cash collateral, 40 and under section 364, the court
must determine that postpetition credit is in the best interest of the
estate.'14  Courts may also use the power to approve professional fees as
a means to encourage efficient resolution of the case.'42
135. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
136. See II U.S.C. § 105(a).
137. See Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter )) Case Management and Delay Reduction: An Empirical
Study, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85, 100-11 (1996).
138. See II U.S.C. § 1112(a).
139. See id. § 362(d)(1) (permitting relief from the stay for cause, including lack of adequate
protection); see also id. § 362(d)(2) (permitting relief from the stay when the debtor lacks equity in
the collateral and the collateral is not necessary to an effective reorganization); id. § 362(d)(3)
(permitting relief from the stay when the debtor does not make interest payments to the secured
creditor in a "single asset" case).
140. See id. § 363(c)(2).
141. See id. § 364(b)-(d).
142. See id. §§ 327-331.
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D. Empirical Evidence of Failure in Chapter 11
In sum, the DIP system substitutes requirements for notice to creditors
and approval by the court for many of the control (ratification and
monitoring) functions exercised by residual owners outside of bankruptcy.
In doing so; the Code fails to impose effective, equivalent restraints on
the agency costs of debt and of the separation of residual ownership and
control in Chapter 11.1 43 This failure is reflected in the low success rate
of Chapter 11 filings. A plan is confirmed in only 26% of all Chapter I 1
cases, and perhaps 25% of these plans are liquidation, not reorganization,
plans. 44  Moreover, between 30 and 40% of these plans are not fully
performed." 5
IV. VOTING UNDER THE CURRENT CHAPTER 11 REGIME
This Part summarizes the requirements for confirming a Chapter 1 1
plan and examines in detail the franchise features of this regime. This
examination demonstrates that the principal purpose and effect of voting
by claim and equity interest holders in Chapter 11 is to allocate the value
of a firm among the various classes of claims and interests. The plan
143. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 482-84.
144. See Gordon Bermant & Edward Flynn, Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: US. Trustee
Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1998, at 8 (estimating that
plans were confirmed in approximately 25.84% of Chapter II cases filed between January 1, 1989
and December 31, 1995); cf Edward Flynn, StatisticalAnalysis of Chapter 11, Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, at 10-13 (1989) (unpublished manuscript) (estimating that 17% of Chapter I I
filings from 1979 through 1986 resulted in a confirmed plan, and that more than 25% of these plans
were liquidating plans; thus, only 10-12% of businesses seeking relief under Chapter I I successfully
reorganized); Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter II Plans Consummate? The Results of
a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 318-19 (1992) (finding that approximately 17%
of the 260 Chapter II cases filed between 1980 and 1989 in the Poughkeepsie Division of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York reached confirmation of a plan, and that
about 26% of the plans were liquidating plans).
It should be noted that not all of the Chapter I I cases in which a plan is not confirmed can be
viewed as failures. At least some of these cases are converted or dismissed with positive outcomes
for the interested parties. See Bufford, supra note 51, at 833 (asserting that "[t]he real success rate
for Chapter II cases is probably in the range of 40%").
It should also be noted the percentage of filings that result in confirmed plans is greatly higher
in large cases than in smaller cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CoRNELL L. REV. 597, 600-01
(1993) (finding that nearly 96% of Chapter II filings by publicly held companies with more than
$100 million in assets resulted in a confirmed plan).
145. See Jensen-Conklin, supra note 144, at 323-25 (finding 42% of confirmed reorganization
(not liquidation) plans were not fully consummated; thus, the percentage of Chapter II debtors who
successfully confirmed and consummated a plan of reorganization in the cases studied was 6.5%);
see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 144, at 608 (finding that 32% of large, publicly held
corporations filed a second Chapter II petition within several years after confirming a plan of
reorganization).
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confirmation scheme in Chapter II does not provide claim or interest
holders a decisive role in deployment issues. Rather, the court holds final
authority over whether a proposed reorganization is the most efficient
response to the debtor's financial crisis. Congress arguably intended one
of the voting requirements, section 1 129(a)(10), to require residual owner
approval for a proposed reorganization. The courts have misunderstood
and misapplied this section, however, and it has not been an effective
constraint on agency costs. The next Part of this Article recommends
amending section 1129(a)(10) to require residual owner endorsement of
a plan as a condition to confirmation.
A. Overview of the Chapter 11 Confirmation Scheme
The major premise of Chapter 11 is that a firm may be more valuable
to claim and interest holders as a going concern than if it is liquidated. 46
Thus, a plan of reorganization may not be confirmed unless each claim
will be paid at least as much as it would in liquidation'47 and the plan is
feasible. 48  The best interests and feasibility requirements together
address the question of whether reorganization or liquidation is the more
efficient response to the debtor's financial distress. The best interests test
ensures baseline protection concerning payment of creditor claims, while
the feasibility requirement assures that the proposed reorganization is
146. There is an important debate over the normative justifications of Chapter 11. Under the
"creditors' bargain" theory, the sole legitimate purpose of reorganization is to preserve the higher,
going concern value of a firm for the benefit of creditors. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note II,
at 100-01; JACKSON, supra note 74, at 209-24. In other words, the reorganization law is justified on
the ground that it represents the agreement creditors would reach among themselves. Other
commentators posit that Chapter I I serves broader purposes, such as the preservation of employment
or community. They do not dispute, however, that a principal justification for the business
reorganization provisions is preservation of the going concern surplus. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 350-52 (1993). See also
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, at 6179, which states:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees
with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a
business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which
they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap .... It is
more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets.
This Article takes no position in this debate. Regardless of the normative justification for Chapter
11, the system can be improved by limiting agency costs of DIP management. See Richard V. Butler
& Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 269, 282-84 (1994) (explaining that even if the going concern surplus is defined to
include societal benefits of continued operation of the business, the latter cannot be preserved unless
income exceeds costs of production).
147. See II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994). This requirement is known as the "best interests test."
148. See id. § 1129(a)(11).
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likely to succeed. Notably, the Code commits both of these determina-
tions to the court.1
49
In addition to the best interests and feasibility requirements, a Chapter
11 plan must be accepted by all classes, 5 ' or else comply with the
absolute priority rule with respect to any dissenting class.' The absolute
priority rule states that no junior class of claims or interests may receive
any payment unless all senior classes are paid in full.' Further, and in
any event, the plan must be accepted by at least one class of impaired
claims, excluding the votes of insiders, if any class of claims is impaired
by the plan."'
B. Sections 1129(a)(8) and (b) and Allocation of the Going Concern
Surplus
The vote of the various classes of claims and equity interests deter-
mines the allocation of the going concern surplus (the difference between
the going concern and liquidation values) among the classes. When a
class votes to accept a plan under section 1129(a)(8), it waives its right
to the protection of the absolute priority rule under section 1129(b).'54
Conversely, a plan must comply with the absolute priority rule with
respect to any dissenting class, that is, the plan must treat the claims in
a dissenting class in accordance with the state law entitlements represent-
ed by their claims.' Thus, while the best interests test ensures a
minimum level of protection to individual creditors respecting payment
of their claims,'56 the "cramdown" protections mandate that classes of
claims will be treated in accordance with their nonbankruptcy
149. See id. § 1 129(a)(7), (11).
150. See id. § i129(a)(8). A plan must designate classes of claims and interests. See id. §
I I23(a)(1). A plan may place a claim or an interest in a class only if it is substantially similar to the
other claims or interests in the class. See id. § 1122. The plan must specify the treatment of each
class. See id. § 1123(a)(2), (3). See generally Scott F. Norberg, Classification of Claims Under
Chapter ]/ of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fallacy of Interest Based Classification, 69 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 119, 147-49 (1995) (discussing the Chapter I I classification rules).
151. See 11 U.S.C. § l129(b)(2)(B), (C). Unimpaired classes of claim and equity holders are
deemed to have accepted the plan, see id. § 1126(o, while classes that will receive nothing under the
plan are deemed to reject the plan, see id § 1126(g). The deemed rejection by classes that will
receive nothing under the plan simply means these classes are automatically protected by the absolute
priority rule. Thus, only impaired claims or interests that will receive a distribution are entitled to
vote on the plan. A class is unimpaired if the plan leaves unaltered the rights of the claim or interest
holders, or the proponent proposes to cure and reinstate the obligation according to its original
maturity. See id. § 1124.
152. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B), (C).
153. See id. § 1129(a)(10).
154. See id. § 1129(a)(8), (b).
155. See id.
156. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
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entitlements unless otherwise agreed. The vote of each class determines
whether that class waives or retains its rights under the absolute priority
rule, and thereby determines how the going concern surplus will be
divided among the various classes.'
The Code requires a supermajority vote of the claimants comprising a
given class for acceptance of the plan and waiver of the cramdown
protections, and the vote of a class binds each member of the class;
acceptance by the required majority of claimants in a class overrides the
state law rights of any dissenters in the class.' Section 1126(c) states
that a class of claims accepts a plan if at least two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the holders of claims in the class accept
the plan.' Stated differently, creditors holding slightly more than two-
thirds of the debt in the class, or one-half in number of the claims in the
class, may block acceptance by the class. 6 °  The votes of all claim
holders, insiders' 6' and noninsiders alike, are counted for purposes of
section 1 129(a)(8), 62 except that votes cast in bad faith may be disquali-
fied. 16
3
The supermajority voting requirement is not explained by the
legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code. It was derived from the
voting requirements of Chapters X and XI of the former Bankruptcy Act,
although the nature of the creditor franchise under the former Act was
very different than under the present Chapter 11.164 The supermajority
157. See id. § I 129(a)(8), (b). The negotiation may, for example, pit unsecured creditors, who
are the residual owners of the firm, against the equity interest holders, whose claims are worth
nothing in liquidation. The unsecured creditors may agree to yield some of their rights under the
absolute priority rule to the equity interest holders in order to entice the shareholder-managers to
continue to manage the firm, which will enable the unsecured creditors to receive more than they
would receive in liquidation. See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Crarmdown and the Code: Calculating
Cramdown Interest Rates Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 241 (1994).
158. See II U.S.C. §§ 1126(c)-(d), 1129(a)(8), (b).
159. See id. § 1126(c).
160. See id. The requirements for acceptance by a class of equity interests do not include a
numerosity requirement. A class of interests accepts a plan if holders of more than two-thirds in
amount of the interests in the class vote to accept the plan. See id § 1126(d).
161. "Insider" is defined in section 101(3 1). If the debtor is a corporation, the term includes
officers, directors, and any other person in control of the debtor. See id. § 101(31)(B).
162. See id. § 1 129(a)(8).
163. See id. § 1126(e).
164. Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, confirmation required acceptance by two-thirds
in amount of the claims in each class, without any provision as to the number of claims that had to
accept, but the vote was unrelated to waiver of the absolute priority rule or allocation of the going
concern surplus. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 179, 52 Stat. 840, 892 (1938) (repealed 1978).
Chapter X extended the absolute priority rule to each individual creditor so that a plan could not be
confirmed unless it complied with the rule or all creditors accepted the plan. At the same time, a
plar could be confirmed under Chapter X over the dissent of any or all classes as long as the
interests of the dissenting classes were adequately protected by the plan. See id. § 221(2), 52 Stat.
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standard may be justified on several related grounds. First, it ensures that
a vote to accept the plan (that is, to waive the cramdown protections) will
"reflect the feelings of a sufficient number of claims of a class of a
sufficient monetary amount to make it fair and equitable for all the
members of the class."'65 In other words, the Code does not lightly bind
dissenters to a decision to waive the priority entitlements of the class.
Further, the rule decreases the instances in which the votes of insiders or
others with additional stakes in the firm will be able to override the
desires of disinterested claim holders. Because the section 1129(a)(8)
vote includes all claim holders (except those disqualified on bad faith
grounds), there is the potential that insider claims will dominate one or
more classes and that the insiders will vote to protect their interests as
shareholders and managers instead of their interests as creditors. The
requirement may also be seen as a response to the collective choice
problem; like shareholders in publicly held companies, creditors are often
widely dispersed and therefore are not informed or do not vote on the
plan.
166
Skeel argues that despite superficial differences between the state and
bankruptcy law voting regimes, there are significant parallels. 67  The
most striking dissimilarity is that the franchise in a solvent corporation
outside of bankruptcy is held exclusively by the residual owners
(shareholders), while in bankruptcy most classes of creditors and equity
holders have the right to vote. Skeel argues that the right to vote in
Chapter 1 1 must be given to each class because the voting will affect the
rights of each class, and permitting one class to decide the rights of other
classes would pose a clear threat of opportunistic behavior by the voting
class.1 6' He also contends that the Code tends to focus voting power in
the residual classes by providing that unimpaired classes are deemed to
at 897; id. § 216(7)-(8), 52 Stat. at 895-96.
Under Chapter XI, confirmation required acceptance by more than one-half in amount and one-
half in number of the claims in each class. See id. § 362(1), 52 Stat. at 911. Again, the vote had
nothing to do with the absolute priority rule or allocation of the going concern surplus; the absolute
priority rule did not apply in Chapter XI. See id. § 366, 52 Stat. at 911-12 (as amended 1952). A
Chapter XI plan could not be confirmed unless accepted by all classes. See id. § 362(1), 52 Stat.
at 911; id. § 366, 52 Stat. at 911-12.
165. In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33 B.R. 141, 148 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981); see DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 1024 (2d ed.
1990).
166. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 489.
167. See id. at 479-81.
168. See id. at 479-80. Skeel notes that under state law, changes in the rights of a particular
class of shareholders must be approved by the class. See id. at 491-92. Unlike the bankruptcy
regime, however, the state rule requires approval of such changes by all shareholders in addition to
the affected class. See REv. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03, 10.04 (1991).
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accept the plan and that classes receiving nothing are deemed to reject the
plan.
169
While the fact that only impaired creditors may vote on a plan tends
to focus voting rights on the residual ownership class, section 1129(a)(8)
is designed neither to require approval by the residual class nor to address
the deployment decision. Indeed, approval by the residual owner class
would be largely coincidental under section 1129(a)(8), because section
1129(b) permits cramdown against any dissenting class. Consider, for
example, a debtor with assets worth $100, a single secured creditor
holding a claim of $75 secured by a security interest in all of the assets,
and unsecured creditors holding claims totaling $50. Suppose the debtor
proposes a plan that impairs both the oversecured creditor and the
unsecured class, and that the oversecured creditor accepts the plan while
the unsecured class votes to reject. The unsecured creditors probably
should be considered the residual claimants, yet the plan can be con-
finned over their rejection if it complies with the absolute priority rule.
Further, although a class might reject a plan for the reason that it does
not make the right deployment decision, the only way to raise this issue
directly is by filing an objection to the plan on the ground that creditors
would receive more in liquidation or that the plan is not feasible, which
would be decided by the court. .That section 1 129(a)(8) is not concerned
with the deployment decision is further evidenced by the fact that all
claimants, including insiders, are entitled to vote. 17  In other words,
section 1129(a)(8) is not concerned with agency costs arising from the
fact that some claimants may have equity or other interests in the firm
that might induce them to favor reorganization even when that will not
maximize the welfare of the firm. Indeed, the inclusion of multiple
groups in the Chapter 11 vote is a source of agency costs. 7 ' The section
1 129(a)(8) franchise in Chapter 11 exacerbates instead of limits agency
costs.
The section 1129(a)(8) voting requirement is analogous to state
corporate voting rules that require approval of proposed changes by each
class of shares whose rights are proposed to be changed.77 But unlike
the Chapter 11 voting regime, these state law provisions also require
approval of any such changes by the common shareholders, who are
normally the residual class. 7 1 Section 1 129(a)(8) requires only that each
169. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 479-80. See supra note 151 and infra note 190 for explanation
of "impairment."
170. The section 1 129(a)(10) vote excludes insiders, but the section 1 129(a)(8) vote does not.
See I I U.S.C. § I 129(a)(8), (10) (1994).
171. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 405.
172. See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03, 10.04, see also Skeel, supra note 6, at 491-92.
173. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 491-92.
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class approve alteration of the class members' state law rights to payment
according to their contracts and does not mandate residual owner
approval of the plan.'74
C. Section 1129(a)(10) and the Decision to Reorganize
Section 1129(a)(10) is among the most enigmatic and frequently
litigated provisions of the Code.' It requires as a condition to confirma-
tion of a plan that "[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at
least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the
plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any
insider."'76 This provision is best understood as requiring acceptance by
a class of residual claimants with appropriate incentives to decide whether
a proposed plan makes an efficient deployment decision. However, the
courts have misunderstood and frequently misapplied the requirement by
permitting strategic uses of the classification' and impairment' rules by
plan proponents.
1. The Purpose of Section 1129(a)(10)
Congress added section 1129(a)(10) to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code late
in the legislative process,' 9 apparently at the behest of banks and
insurance companies.' 80 As originally enacted, it provided that "[t]he
court shall confirm a plan only if ... [a]t least one class of claims has
accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the
plan by any insider holding a claim of such class."'' The legislative
reports accompanying the 1978 Code shed no light on the purpose of the
provision.
81
Congress amended section 1129(a)(10) in 1984 to clarify that it
requires acceptance by an impaired class, and that a deemed accepting
174. See I1 U.S.C. § I129(a)(8), (b).
175. See cases cited infra notes 185, 197, 203, and 205-06; see also REFORMING THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 10, at 276-77; Norberg, supra note 150, at 147-49.
176. II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
177. See id. § 1122.
178. See id. § 1124.
179. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 565-66 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989),
aft'd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991); S. 2266, 95th Cong.
§ 1130(a)(12) (1978).
180. See Bankruptcy Act Revisions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on HR. 31 and HR. 32, 94th Cong. 1604 (1976)
(statement of John J. Creedon, American Life Ins. Ass'n).
181. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1129(a)(10), 92 Stat. 2549,2635-37
(1978).
182. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 9-12, 128 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, at
5795-98, 5914.
1998]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
class" 3 does not satisfy the provision. This change was not accompanied
by any report. A Senate Report to similar legislation introduced but not
enacted in 1979 stated cryptically that the revision was meant to ensure
acceptance of a plan by a "real class" of creditors. 84
The legislative history, then, sheds little light on the rationale for
section 1129(a)( 10). Three observations of the statute itself suggest that
it mandates residual owner support of a plan. First, although courts
generally have regarded section 1129(a)(10) as a condition to
cramdown,"'5 it is in fact a requirement for confirmation regardless of
whether a plan is accepted by all classes pursuant to section 1129(a)(8).' 86
In other words, even if every class of impaired claims accepts a plan, the
plan may not be confirmed unless at least one impaired class accepts the
plan while excluding the votes of any insiders.'87 Section 1129(a)(10)
imposes a requirement that is separate from and additional to section
1129(a)(8). Whereas the class vote under section 1129(a)(8) includes
both insiders and noninsiders, the section 1129(a)(10) vote excludes
183. Recall section 1126(o provides that an unimpaired class is automatically and conclusively
deemed to accept the plan. See supra note 151.
184.
This amendment makes clear the intent of section 1129(a)(10) that one 'real' class of
creditors must vote for the plan of reorganization. A class that is deemed to have
accepted the plan because it is unimpaired or acceptance of a small class of claims
permitted to be created for administrative convenience will not satisfy this requirement.
S. REP. No. 96-305, at 13 (1979). Senator Edwards made these comments on the floor of the House
concerning amendment of section 1129(a)(10):
Under chapter XII of the former act, debtors were able to cram down on non-accepting
creditors a plan which no creditor whose claim had been impaired had agreed to ...
... Creditors whose claims were impaired by the debtor's proposal to pay less than
100 percent should not be forced to accept a plan unless some other creditor whose claim
was impaired had agreed to the plan.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, under I 129(a)( 10) as it is proposed to be amended, a creditor
whose claim is impaired under section 1124 must first accept the debtor's plan before the
plan can be crammed down with respect to other impaired nonaccepting creditors.
126 CONG. REc. 31917 (1980) (statement of Sen. Edwards) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Edwards].
185. See, e.g., Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor
on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Duval Manor Assocs., 203 B.R.
42, 44 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996);.In re Fur Creations by Varriale, Ltd., 188 B.R. 754, 760 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 148 B.R. 1010, 1020 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993))
(stating that section I 129(a)(10) "ensures that prior to 'embarking on the tortuous path of cramdown
and compelling the target of cramdown to shoulder the risks of error necessarily associated with a
forced confirmation,' there is a showing that some group hurt by the plan favors the plan"); In re 266
Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. 275,287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that section 1 129(a)(10) acts
as a "statutory gatekeeper barring access to cram down where there is absent even one impaired class
accepting the plan").
186. See I I U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1994) ("The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following
requirements are met .... ").
187. See id. § 1129(a)(10).
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insiders. 8 A plan might be accepted by all classes when counting the
votes of insiders, but not by any impaired class excluding the ballots cast
by insiders."9
Second, the exclusion of insider votes under section 1129(a)(10)
ensures that the required vote is not tainted by claimants' conflicting
equity or employment interests in the firm. The shareholder-managers of
the firm often are also significant creditors of the firm. Section
1129(a)(10) anticipates that they may cast their votes in furtherance of
their interests as shareholders and managers (which as discussed at length
above, differ greatly from the interests of residual owners) and therefore
excludes them from the vote. Stated differently, section 1129(a)(10)
limits agency costs by restricting the vote thereunder to claim holders as
claim holders.
Third, section 1129(a)(10) requires acceptance by an impaired class.
While an impaired class will not necessarily be comprised of residual
owners, the residual ownership class will by definition be an impaired
class. Under section 1124, a class is impaired unless the plan leaves
unaltered the rights of the claim holders or cures and reinstates the claims
in the class.' ° The residual owners of a firm are the class of claim or
equity holders that will receive the remaining value of the firm after all
senior claims and interests are paid in full and thus hold both the
potential for gain and the risk of loss resulting from deployment
decisions.'"9
In sum, section 1 129(a)(10) should be seen as an attempt to ensure that
a proposed plan is approved by at least one class of claims with a
188. See id.
189. See In re United Marine, Inc., 197 B.R. 942, 946 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that
insider votes are counted for purposes of section i 129(a)(8)); In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1989) (same); In re Grimes Furniture, Inc., 47 B.R. 68 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (same).
To illustrate, consider a plan that has been accepted by all classes of claims including the general
unsecured class, which is impaired by the plan. Assume that the general unsecured class is composed
of $100,000 in claims, $30,000 of which are held by the debtor's president and major shareholder.
Further assume that 70% of the general unsecured class accepted the plan, including the shareholder-
president. Excluding his vote, only 4/7 or 57% of the class accepted the plan. Thus, the plan
complies with section 1 129(a)(8) but not (a)(i 0), unless there is another impaired class that has voted
to accept the plan without counting the votes of any insider in the class.
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124. A class impaired under section 1124 may be one which (I) the plan
pays less than required by the cramdown rules (in which case the plan may not be confirmed unless
the class accepts the plan), or (2) the plan pays in accordance with the cramdown rules but not in full
(in which case the plan may be confirmed without acceptance by the class). In the former case, by
accepting the plan the class agrees to yield some of its rights under the absolute priority rule because
it anticipates a better result from the reorganization than from liquidation. In the latter, the class
must take a loss but is assured that it will receive more than in liquidation and that junior claims will
not share in the going concern surplus at the expense of the dissenting class. See id. § 1129(b).
191. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
1998]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
residual ownership interest in the debtor that does not hold a conflicting
stake in the case. Whereas in liquidation a firm's assets are sold to third
parties, in Chapter l I the assets are in effect sold to the creditors.'92 A
"critical question" in Chapter 11 is whether reorganization will yield
more for creditors than liquidation.'93 When no group of residual owners
with the proper incentives to maximize the firm's welfare approves a
plan, it follows that they do not see a greater benefit in reorganization
than in liquidation.
Under this view, section 1 129(a)(10) is partially redundant of sections
1129(a)(7) and (a)(11), which condition confirmation on findings that
each creditor will receive more under the plan than in liquidation and that
the plan is feasible, regardless of acceptance by the various classes.
However, the judgment of noninsider impaired creditors on these
questions would be an important check on the courts' power and a
reinforcement for the courts' competence to judge the viability of a
business.
2. Strategic Classification and Strategic Impairment of Claims
The courts are divided over the import of section 1129(a)(10). The
usual battleground for whether a plan complies with the provision is a
single asset real estate case in which the debtor's principal asset is a
shopping mall, apartment complex, or office building.' 94 The creditors
of the debtor generally include: (1) a financial institution that made a loan
secured by the debtor's assets, now worth less than the amount of the
lender's claim, and (2) unsecured trade creditors. Pursuant to Code
section 506(a), the undersecured lender holds a secured claim in an
amount equal to the value of the property, and an unsecured claim for the
balance of the debt.' 95 Because the lender has an unsecured claim for the
deficiency, it is entitled to vote on the plan as an unsecured creditor.
Because the lender ordinarily holds more than two-thirds of the total
unsecured debt, it is usually in a position to cause a class comprising all
unsecured claims to vote to reject the plan. Assuming that the lender will
vote both its secured and unsecured claims against the plan, the plan will
be unconfirmable for lack of acceptance by an impaired, accepting class
as required by section 1129(a)(10).' 96
In order to meet the impaired, accepting class requirement and confirm
a plan over the undersecured lender's opposition, debtors have submitted
192. See JACKSON, supra note 74, at 210-1I.
193. See id. at 209-10; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
194. "Single asset real estate" is defined in II U.S.C. § 101(51B).
195. See id. § 506(a).
196. See Norberg, supra note 150, at 153-60.
[Vol. 46
VOTING THEORY IN CHAPTER 11
plans that classify the lender's unsecured deficiency claim separately from
the unsecured trade claims, proposing to impair the trade class but treat
it sufficiently favorably to procure its vote in favor of the plan. Many
courts have approved this "artificial classification" strategy, reasoning in
part that section 1129(a)(10) simply ensures that a plan cannot be
crammed down over the opposition of all creditors. In their view, section
1129(a)(10) requires only some minimal level of support from creditors
impaired by the plan. 97 Obviously, if their analysis governed, compli-
ance with section 1129(a)(10) would not indicate residual owner support
for the plan. Rather, in such cases the court alone determines whether
the plan is feasible and in the best interests of creditors.
A majority of courts have disapproved separate classification of similar
claims in the absence of a legitimate business justification for treating the
separate classes of similar claims differently.'98 In those courts, the
result is almost always that the residual owner-the undersecured
lender-decides the reorganization versus liquidation question. When all
similar claims are classified together (and the impairment of the claims
in the impaired, accepting class is necessary, not artificial' 99), the
undersecured creditor determines whether a reorganization will go
forward. There is no going concern surplus in single asset real estate
cases, 200 and the risk of loss is borne mainly by the residual claimant. A
vote by the undersecured lender/residual owner under section 11 29(a)(10)
that determines approval of the plan is justified by agency cost analy-
sis-the class with the appropriate incentives to make an efficient
decision has responsibility for deciding the fate of the firm. Further,
even if going concern value exceeded liquidation value, the undersecured
lender has the appropriate incentives to determine whether the proposed
deployment of assets is efficient.
Even when a plan classifies similar claims (e.g., an undersecured
lender's unsecured deficiency claim and unsecured trade claims) together,
section 1129(a)(10) will not ascertain residual owner support for the plan
if the claims in a proper class are "artificially" impaired. "Artificial"
impairment occurs when the plan alters the rights of the claim holders not
197. See, e.g., In re Triple R Holdings, L.P., 134 B.R. 382, 389-92 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991),
rev'd, 145 B.R. 57 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1989); 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 93:4,
at 93-15 (2d ed. 1994); see also Statement of Sen. Edwards, supra note 184. See generally Norberg,
supra note 150, at 147-49 (discussing the domain of section 1129(a)(10)).
198. See Norberg, supra note 150, at 153-60 (discussing cases disapproving separate
classification of similar claims); see also In re Fur Creations by Varriale, Ltd., 188 B.R. 754, 760-61
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
199. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (discussing "artificial impairment").
200. See David Gray Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the Single Asset Chapter 11 Case, 23
CAP. U. L. REv. 339, 339-40 (1994).
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because the impairment is necessary to restructure the business operations
but in order to satisfy the impaired, accepting class requirement. In other
words, section 1129(a)(10) admits the possibility that the accepting
impaired class is not the residual class. For example, a plan must
separately classify unsecured employees' wage claims (because they have
priority over most other unsecured claims 20 1) and each secured claim
against the debtor.202 When such claims are relatively minor, there may
be little business purpose to impairing them. However, the plan
proponent might nevertheless slightly impair the claims so as to engineer
an impaired accepting class. 2 3 As in the case of artificial classification,
acceptance by an "artificially" impaired class does not signal residual
owner support for the proposed deployment of assets under the plan.204
Again, the courts addressing the issue are divided on whether the Code
permits unnecessary impairment of claims for purposes of meeting the
section 1129(a)(10) requirement.20 5
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994).
202. See id. §§ 507(a)(3), 1122, 1123(a)(1). See, e.g., In re Duval Manor Assocs., 203 B.R. 42,
45-46 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
203. Cf In re United Marine, Inc., 197 BR. 942, 945 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that
acceptance by $125,000 secured claim satisfied section I 129(a)(10) in case involving over $7 million
in total debt).
204. As another example, assume impairment of an oversecured creditor's claim that is necessary,
not "artificial." The impaired, oversecured creditor class probably would not be considered the
residual ownership class, but acceptance by this class will satisfy section 1129(a)(10). (Arguably,
though, the oversecured creditor whose claim is neither cured and reinstated nor paid in full on the
effective date of the plan should be considered a residual claimant because it risks nonpayment of
its claim should the plan fail. While a vote against the plan by the oversecured creditor should not
be determinative of the reorganization versus liquidation issue, its vote in favor of the plan does
indicate that the plan has the support of a party with something on the line. This analysis ultimately
is unsatisfactory because the oversecured creditor does not stand to gain from any upside potential
of the deployment decision and, depending on the extent to which it is oversecured, may bear very
little of the downside risk.)
205. The only two circuit courts that have directly addressed the issue are split. See Windsor
on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.),
7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993) (disapproving artificial impairment because it renders section 1 129(a)(10)
a dead letter and produces an absurd result); L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int'l, Inc.
(In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving creditor plan proponent's
artificial impairment of its own claim by strictly construing section 1124's definition of impairment
as any alteration in creditor rights); see also David Gray Carlson, The Classification Veto in Single-
Asset Cases Under Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(10), 44 S.C. L. REv. 565, 610-14 (1993); cf
Bank of America, Illinois v. 203 North Lasalle St. Partnership, 195 B.R. 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996)
(approving slight impairment of relatively small class when the impairment, although not absolutely
necessary, was not solely to obtain impaired accepting class).
Congress amended section 1124 in 1994 to provide that a class of claims is impaired even when
the plan proposes to pay them in full. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 213(d), 108 Stat. 4126 (repealing II U.S.C. § 1124(3) (1988)). The amendment arguably sanctions
artificial impairment by stating that claims are impaired notwithstanding payment in full,
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In a few cases, involving solvent debtors, the plan is accepted by an
artificially impaired class of claims but has the support of the residual
owners. For example, when a solvent debtor's plan impairs the primary
secured lender's claim and unnecessarily impairs a class of unsecured
trade claims, a rule against artificial impairment of a class meeting the
section 1129(a)(10) requirement might preclude confirmation of a plan
supported by the residual owners, here the class of equity interests. 6
Arguably, though, the solvent debtor is even less deserving of protection
under Chapter 11 than the debtor who has filed to protect creditor
interests.° 7
V. LIMITING THE AGENCY COSTS OF DIP CONTROL IN CHAPTER 11
THROUGH USE OF A RESIDUAL OWNER FRANCHISE
The central dilemma under the current Chapter 11 regime is that in
most cases the managers who control the debtor are not the residual
owners and do not possess appropriate incentives to make efficient asset
deployment decisions. This Part considers whether the agency costs of
the separation of residual ownership and control in Chapter 11 may be
more effectively constrained by incorporating into Chapter 11 a residual
owner franchise analogous to the shareholder franchise in solvent firms
outside of bankruptcy. This discussion is divided into two parts. The
first considers residual owner suffrage during the pendency of the case.
The second addresses whether residual owner approval should be required
for confirmation of a plan.
A. Residual Owner Voting During the Pendency of a Case
One response to the agency cost problem in Chapter 11 would be for
the Code to grant voting rights to the residual owners of the debtor upon
contradicting the premise that section 1 129(a)(10) mandates residual owner consent. See Equitable
Life Ins. Co. v. Atlanta-Stewart Partners (In re Atlanta-Stewart Partners), 193 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1996) (holding that acceptance by class of claims to be paid in full without interest satisfied
section 1129(a)(10) although the impairment was not necessary to restructure the debtor's debts);
accord PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Park Forest Dev. Corp. (In re Park Forest Dev. Corp.), 197 B.R.
388 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996). On the other hand, the House Report states the amendment was
intended to reverse the "unfair result" in In re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1994),
in which the court held that a class was not impaired when the solvent debtor's plan provided for
payment in full without postpetition interest. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 47-48 (1994).
206. See, e.g., In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d at 132 (disapproving impairment
when "the alteration of rights ... arises solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion"); 203 North
Lasalle St. Partnership, 195 B.R. at 692 (approving slight impairment of relatively small class when
the impairment, although not absolutely necessary, was not solely to obtain impaired accepting class);
In re Curtis Center Ltd. Partnership, 192 B.R. 648, 658-59 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); In re Dunes
Hotel Assocs., 188 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1995).
207. See Carlson, supra note 200, at 357-59.
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the filing of a petition, giving these claimants authority from the outset
of the case to remove managers and approve significant deployment
decisions. As in solvent companies outside of bankruptcy, a residual
owner franchise in Chapter 11 would check managers' inappropriate
incentives and limit agency costs arising from the separation of residual
ownership and control of the debtor.
The costs of transferring voting rights to residual owners immediately
upon bankruptcy would probably outweigh the benefits, however.
Identifying the residual owners at the early stages of a Chapter 11 case
would require valuation of all firm assets, and valuation is typically time-
consuming, expensive and less than reliable.2" 8 Further, unless and until
extinguished, even the equity interests in an insolvent firm have some
value; there is always a chance that the firm's fortunes will take a turn
for the better and yield value to the equity interests.0 9
Skeel has argued that in large cases the DIP should be more account-
able to residual owners during the pendency of a Chapter 11 case, in
particular respecting asset sales and directorial elections. 2' Recognizing
the difficulties in designating the residual class, he proposes that the Code
set a rule for all cases granting the class of general unsecured creditors
authority to approve asset sales and replace management. 2 " He argues
that unsecured creditors are the residual owners in most large cases2 2 and
208. See, e.g., Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Settlement Imperative, 39 BUS. LAW. 441, 454 (1984).
There are two ways that assets could be valued without incurring the costs of a formal appraisal
performed specially for the purpose of identifying the residual owners. First, the Code could require
identification of the residual class based on the schedule of assets filed by the debtor at the beginning
of the case. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007 & Official Form 6 (requiring the debtor to state the value
of property of the estate). This approach is problematic because shareholder-managers would tend
to overstate asset values in order to identify the equity holders as the residual owners, or else
schedule the values as "unknown."
More realistically, the Code could provide a special rule allowing valuation of the firm's assets
for purposes of determining who holds the franchise only in cases involving a secured creditor with
a security interest in substantially all of the assets of the debtor. The costs of appraisal in these cases
are relatively modest, and the debtor and secured creditor generally have collateral appraised for other
purposes, such as a motion for relief from stay or an objection to confirmation of any plan. See, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 1129(b)(2)(A) (1994). This approach would spare the shareholders and
management of most large, publicly held debtors from a transfer of voting rights, but would affect
many smaller debtors, which confront the most acute agency cost problems in any event. The capital
structure of large, public corporations rarely involves a single creditor with a security interest in
substantially all of a large debtor's assets. By contrast, the capital structure of the typical small or
medium-sized debtor includes a primary secured creditor with a security interest in substantially all
assets of the debtor. See supra note 51 and accompanying text
209. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 771-76; Skeel, supra note 6, at 487.
210. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 498-501, 510-12.
211. See id.
212. In a few large debtor cases, though, the debtor is solvent and the equity holders therefore
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that the costs that may arise from the clear rule when unsecured creditors
are not the residual owners may be justified by the benefits of a clear
rule.2" 3
While a fixed rule granting decision-making authority to unsecured
creditors might be appropriate in large cases, an undersecured primary
creditor often is the residual claimant in small and medium-sized cases.
In these cases a per se rule giving the franchise to unsecured creditors
would mean that a class lacking appropriate incentives to maximize firm
value frequently would hold decision-making authority.
Finally, even if the residual class could be identified without undue
difficulty, a rule transferring voting authority to residual claimants upon
the filing of a petition, like a rule requiring appointment of a trustee,
would likely deter viable businesses from seeking Chapter 11 relief until
it is too late. 24 In the cases of small and medium-sized debtors, the
already-strapped business usually could not survive the added costs of a
change in management or the appointment of a trustee.2
B. Residual Owner Voting on Confirmation of a Plan
1. Requiring Residual Owner Approval
While a requirement for residual owner approval of the plan would not
directly address the significant agency costs that may be incurred between
the filing of a petition and the resolution of a case by dismissal,
conversion, or confirmation of a plan,2" 6 it would ensure that reorganiza-
constitute the residual class. See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 745.
213. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 500-05. One cost of the per se rule proposed by Skeel would
be the necessity in some cases of valuing collateral of undersecured creditors in order to determine
the amount of the creditors' claims to be counted in the balloting. Also, asset values can fluctuate
during the pendency of the case, changing the amount of claims in the unsecured class.
214. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 5, at 756-58 (arguing that Chapter I I relies mostly
on voluntary filings, and that filings will be delayed by rules that immediately divest managers of
control). Skeel's proposal is less problematic than a rule transferring authority to the residual class
immediately upon filing in that it calls for voting by the residual class only on certain matters-asset
sales and directorial elections-and not a complete transfer of authority. See Skeel, supra note 6,
at 494-512. But see Cuevas, supra note 5, at 404-16 (proposing that at the inception of a Chapter
I I case unsecured creditors have the option of replacing existing management with a trustee).
215. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing the utility of the Code provision
for appointment of a trustee as a limit on agency costs of DIP management).
216. The most effective response to the agency costs of DIP control that arise during the
preconfirmation period may be to require debtors to file plans within a specified time so as to
minimize the length of time spent in Chapter I1. It is not enough, at least in small and medium-
sized cases where creditors are unlikely to propose a plan, to simply curtail extensions of exclusivity.
Many commentators have urged more aggressive steps to limit the time debtors spend in Chapter 11.
See, e.g., LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter II, supra note 5, at 749-56 (calling for "preemptive
cramdown" that would extinguish the interests of shareholders in clearly insolvent debtors in large
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tion plan decisions are approved by the owners who will reap the benefit
and incur the detriment of the decisions. Such a mandate would directly
respond to the problem of so many confirmed plans not being consum-
mated.2" 7 In addition to the feasibility 8 and best interests21 9 determina-
tions made by the court, a requirement for residual owner approval would
mean that the claim or equity holders with the appropriate incentives to
maximize the value of the firm will also decide these issues. The
residual owners have better incentives than the bankruptcy judge, who has
no financial stake in the firm, to make efficient deployment decisions.
Agency costs analysis teaches that the quality of the feasibility and best
interests decisions will improve when the decision maker has appropriate
incentives to make an efficient decision. If the quality of these decisions
is improved, fewer nonfeasible plans will be confirmed and more
confirmed plans will be consummated.
Moreover, requiring residual owner approval of a plan would force the
DIP to respond directly to the residual owners on asset deployment issues
during the negotiation of a plan. In the same way that the DIP under the
current Code must negotiate with classes of claimants concerning
allocation of the value of the firm,220 a residual owner franchise would
compel the DIP to negotiate with the residual owners on 'the asset
deployment issues. Under the current Code, the plan proponent must
show the court that a plan is feasible and will pay each creditor more
than it would receive in liquidation, 22 ' but these issues are not set
squarely on the table for consideration or negotiation by the creditors.
Individual creditors may object to confirmation on the grounds that the
plan is not feasible or does not meet the best interests test, but the court,
not the residual owner class, has the final word.222 Although a class
might reject a plan under the current Code on the ground that it does not
make the right deployment decision, the' dissenting class may or may not
reorganization cases and for a "fast track" in small reorganization cases); LoPucki & Whitford, supra
note 5, at 787-88 (calling on bankruptcy courts to expedite Chapter I I cases); Edward I. Altman,
Comment, Evaluating the Chapter Il Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 ("Since time and out-of-pocket direct bankruptcy costs are obviously positively
correlated, any shortening of the reorganization period under Chapter I I ... would probably provide
a net benefit by conserving assets.").
217. See Jensen-Conklin, supra note 144, at 323-25 (finding that 42% of confirmed reorganiza-
tion plans in cases filed between 1980 and 1989 in the Poughkeepsie Division of the Southern
District of New York were not consummated).
218. See I1 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1994).
219. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
220. See id. § 1129(a)(8), (b); see also discussion supra Part W.B.
221. See II U.S.C. § II29(a)(7), (II).
222. See id.
[Vol. 46
VOTING THEORY IN CHAPTER 1 1
represent residual owners generally and may be crammed down by
decision of the court.
2. Identifying the Residual Owner Class
A requirement for residual owner approval of a plan would, of course,
require identification of the members of the residual owner class.
Identifying this class at the time of confirmation would not entail the
same problems as doing so prior to confirmation. Unless all creditors
accept the plan (in which case there is no issue of residual owner
approval), the court must value the assets of the business in order to
determine whether the plan complies with the best interests test.22 3 That
liquidation analysis will determine the residual ownership class by
ascertaining what creditors would receive in liquidation. While identify-
ing the residual ownership class before confirmation involves collapsing
future values to a present value, which may ignore potential future
increases in the value of the business, 224 the confirmation of a plan finally
determines each claimant's rights in the reorganized firm.
In most cases, the residual ownership class will be a class that has
already been designated for purposes of sections 1129(a)(8) and (b),
which provide for a vote by each class on waiving or retaining protection
of the absolute priority rule. In some cases, the residual ownership class
will be comprised of the claimants in more than one of the section
1129(a)(8) classes. For example, when a plan designates more than one
class of general unsecured creditors and the value of the debtor's assets
exceeds the sum of the liens against those assets and priority claims, the
several classes of unsecured creditors will comprise the residual owner-
ship class.225
223. See id. § I 129(a)(7).
224. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
225. As an alternative to designating the residual ownership class based on the liquidation
analysis, there is a case to be made for designating all impaired creditors as residual owners, and
requiring approval of the plan by a majority of all impaired claims that will not be canceled by the
plan. Although a class may be impaired but not residual when the firm is valued by collapsing all
future values to a present value, a creditor whose claim is neither cured and reinstated nor paid in
full on the effective date of the plan arguably should be considered a residual claimant because it
risks nonpayment of its restructured claim should the plan fail. The significant flaw of this approach
is that a plan proponent might artificially impair creditors for the purpose of obtaining acceptance
of the plan by a majority of impaired claims. Although artificial impairment could be prohibited,
the incentive to do so will, as under the current section I 129(a)(l0), create litigation on the question.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 205.
19981
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
3. Agency Cost Problems with a Residual Owner Franchise
When residual owners hold other claims or interests with respect to a
firm, they may cast their votes to advance those other interests instead of
their residual ownership positions. Stated differently, residual owners
with other claims or interests will not share gains or losses commensurate
with their voting influence. Voting by residual owners with multiple
interests introduces agency costs. For example, when residual owners of
an insolvent debtor are also managers, they may vote their claims to
advance their interests as managers. Managers may favor deployment
decisions that other residual owners oppose because they would protect
the managers' interests. Accordingly, as under section 1 129(a)(10) of the
current Code, insider votes should be excluded from the residual owner
franchise. (It should be noted, however, that this exclusion itself
introduces agency costs because the remaining, noninsider claimants will
not reap the full benefits nor incur the full costs of their decisions; the
excluded insiders will enjoy some of the benefits and incur their
proportionate share of the costs of the decisions.)
A related issue concerns the majority required for acceptance of the
plan by the residual owner class. Under the present Code, acceptance
requires the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds in amount and one-half
in number of the claims in the class. 226 This supermajority voting
standard may be appropriate with respect to class decisions on whether
to waive the class members' entitlements under the absolute priority
rule,227 but imposes agency costs when applied to deployment decisions
by the residual owner class; the supermajority voting standard is a
departure from a one vote per share standard that permits a minority of
claims to decide the rights of all members of the class. It generates
potential agency costs because a minority who do not receive benefits or
losses coextensively with their voting power may cause rejection of the
plan.22 8 The standard for approval of a plan by the residual class should
be a simple majority so that economic consequences are aligned with
voting influence.
4. The Collective Action Problem
The collective action problem will not obviate a requirement for
residual owner approval of a plan. Although in many cases a diffusion
of claims and managers' information advantages may leave residual
226. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
227. See id. § 1129(a)(8), (b). See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
228. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 408-10; see also Skeel, supra note 6, at 489-
90 (arguing that a simple majority vote standard should be applied to class votes pursuant to section
I 129(a)(8)).
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owners without an economic incentive to become informed and vote on
a plan, a residual owner franchise in Chapter 11, as under state law, will
promote efficiency at the margins. The works of Fischel and
Easterbrook and Skeel have convincingly shown that the shareholder
franchise persists as the core feature of corporate governance outside of
bankruptcy because it reduces agency costs of the separation of ownership
and control.229
Moreover, the collective action problem may be less acute in Chapter
11 for several reasons. First, the Code provisions for creditors' commit-
tees ease the problem by providing for representation of unsecured
creditors at the estate's expense by a committee composed of the largest
unsecured claim holders.23 (As noted above, however, creditors'
committees are generally organized only in large cases, and unsecured
creditors are not always the residual owners.) Second, no collective
action problem exists in cases involving a primary, undersecured creditor.
Here, a single creditor is the residual owner, and a diffusion of small
claims obviously does not impede the residual owner from casting an
informed vote on the plan. Finally, the growing market for trading
claims and for corporate control in bankrupt firms increases claims
aggregation and diminishes the collective action problem.
5. Revising Section 1129(a)(10)
This Article's analysis of the relationship between agency costs and
voting under state law and federal bankruptcy law leads to the conclusion
that part of the response to the dilemma of DIP control in Chapter 11 is
to require residual owner approval as a condition to confirmation of a
plan. Although Congress may have intended in section 1129(a)(10) to
impose such a requirement, the statute has proved unequal to the task.
Contrary to the calls for repeal of the provision,' this Article argues for
amending the provision so that it in fact requires residual owner approval
of a plan. The Code should require acceptance of a plan by the class (or
classes) of impaired claim or equity interest holders that, based on the
liquidation analysis required by section 1 129(a)(7), would receive partial
payment if the firm were liquidated. As thus amended, the provision
would avoid the artificial classification and artificial impairment problems
that have plagued the current section 1129(a)(10). It would also permit
equity holders to control the asset deployment decisions when the firm is
solvent; under the current section 1129(a)(10), a plan must be accepted
229. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 406-08; Skeel. supra note 6, at 519-33.
230. See Skeel, supra note 6, at 525-30.
23 1. See supra note 10.
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by an impaired class of claims.232 In order to minimize agency costs, the
vote should exclude insiders, as under the current provision. Unlike the
present statute, a revised statute should avoid reintroducing agency costs
by requiring acceptance by only a simple majority in amount of the
claims or interests in the class(es).
VI. CONCLUSION
The central dilemma in Chapter 11 is that the managers who have
primary authority for asset deployment decisions generally lack the
appropriate incentives to make efficient decisions. Chapter 11 generally
leaves the prebankruptcy managers in control of the firm but does not
adequately constrain their authority to act contrary to the interests of the
firm. In the normal nonbankruptcy operation of a firm, the shareholder
franchise acts as a significant limitation on the discretion of managers.
The right to vote is the right to make all decisions not otherwise specified
by contract, and shareholders hold the franchise because they are the
residual owners of a solvent company and, therefore, possess the proper
incentives to maximize firm value. Under the current bankruptcy regime,
there is no effective parallel limitation on the DIP. Congress probably
intended section 1129(a)(10) to require residual owner approval for a
reorganization plan, but unartfully drafted the provision and consequently
the courts have not correctly or consistently interpreted it. By giving the
residual owners authority to approve a proposed plan, Chapter 11 will
take an important step toward more effectively constraining the agency
costs of DIP control.
232. See II U.S.C. § I I29(a)(I0).
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